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III. Introduction 
 
In the United States, publicly-held companies are required to present their financial 
statements according to a set of accounting standards and rules known as Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP.  A company’s management has responsibility 
for preparing the company’s financial statements.  The role of independent certified public 
accountants, auditors, is to audit the financial statements and render an opinion as to 
whether the financial statements are fairly stated and comply in all material respects with 
GAAP.  The auditor’s report, which communicates the auditor’s opinion, has been criticized 
for being a pass/fail report that has little communicative value (PCAOB Open Board 
Meeting, 2016).  
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which sets standards 
for audit procedures and reporting practices, regulates auditors of publicly-held companies.  
The PCAOB is currently considering a proposal to expand the auditor’s report from the 
standardized one page report to a more in-depth discussion by the auditor about matters that 
pertain directly to the company.  The expansion would remedy the formulaic language of 
audit reports, introduce critical audit matters (CAMs) in the report, and require the auditor 
to disclose his or her tenure in the report (PCAOB Open Board Meeting, 2016).   
The PCAOB proposal comes at a relevant time because the United Kingdom 
recently adopted an expanded auditor’s report.  In 2013, the Financial Reporting Council of 
the United Kingdom (FRC) adopted new standards for the auditor’s report in the UK.  The 
change in standards came in response to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, which left 
investors feeling blindsided by numerous bankruptcies where audits were seen to fail to give 
warning of imminent collapse (House of Lords, 2011).  The new reports in the UK allow 
auditors to take a more free-form approach to writing the auditor’s report, thus doing away 
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with formulaic language (PCAOB White Paper, 2016).  The new standard also requires 
auditors to identify key audit matters and to report risks of material misstatement, as well as 
describe how the audit scope addressed those risks.  For the remainder of the paper, the 
term CAMs will be used to describe both key audit matters (the term adopted in the UK) 
and critical audit matters (the term proposed in the US).  
This paper will examine whether the expanded auditor’s reports provide additional 
information beyond what management discusses in Management Discussion and Analysis 
and footnotes to the financial statements by performing a qualitative analysis of the 
information provided in the expanded auditor’s reports of four major UK grocery store 
chains both before and after the adoption of the new standard.  This paper also examines 
whether the reported CAMs change from year to year.  The results of the paper should be 
useful to policymakers in the US as they decide whether or not to adopt an expanded 
auditor’s report similar to the one now required in the UK.  In my analysis I find that the 
external auditor is frequently reporting on CAMs that are already being reported by 
management, and therefore already communicated to investors, suggesting little to no added 
value in the expanded auditor’s report.  However, it also may suggest that what the auditor 
reports influences what management reports, which could provide added value for investors.  
In the next section, I review the history of audit reporting standards in the US and 
the UK, explain the PCAOB proposal, and survey academic research on this subject.  In the 
sections following the introduction, I will explain the procedures and results of my 
qualitative analysis.  
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IV. Background 
 
A. History 
In the 1800s audit reports were extremely brief, often 50 words or fewer (Chalmers, 
et al., 2015).  This audit report was often referred to as a certificate, wherein the auditor 
certified some level of fairness, trueness, or correctness of the financial statements (Church, 
et al., 2008).  These reports were generally non-standardized, and investors were left to their 
own devices to determine the level of assurance provided by the auditor (Brown, et al.).  The 
auditor’s report saw its first element of standardization in 1934 when the New York Stock 
Exchange issued regulations requiring audit reports to include a scope and an opinion 
paragraph (Brown, et al.).  The scope paragraph explained what the audit entailed and the 
opinion stated whether the company followed generally established accounting principles 
(Church, et al., 2008).  Standardization was meant to aid users in identifying non-standard 
audit reports (Brown, et al.).  The phrase “generally accepted accounting principles” (GAAP) 
was introduced for the first time in 1939 (Geiger, 1993).  
For the next 60 years, the auditor’s report was essentially unchanged, with minor 
exceptions.  During this period, changes to the auditor’s report focused mainly on the 
wording of the reports, as well as guidance on reporting on non-standard issues (Brown, et 
al.).  The wording of the reports expanded to include explanations of the audit process, as 
well as explicit recognition of the auditor’s reporting responsibilities (Church, et al., 2008).  
Standard reports received an unqualified opinion, meaning no material errors were detected 
by the audit.  Non-standard reports included qualified opinions, meaning isolated material 
errors exist in the financial statements; disclaimers of opinion, meaning the auditor gave no 
opinion because the audit lacked enough evidence; and adverse opinions, meaning the 
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auditor identified multiple or significant material errors or misstatements, which are rare 
because auditors generally communicate large errors to management to correct so that they 
can then issue an unqualified or qualified opinion (Church, et al., 2008).  
Accounting scandals in the early 2000s, such as Enron and WorldCom, caused 
investors to lose trust in auditors and in the credibility of the auditor’s report.  As a result, 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which in turn created the PCAOB, and 
further standardized the auditor’s report.  The new standards required auditors to give an 
opinion on both the fairness of the financial statements and on internal control over 
financial reporting, including a description of any identified material weaknesses (Church, et 
al., 2008).  Critics argued that the enhanced structure of the auditor’s report changed the 
nature of what the auditor’s report stands for (Church, et al., 2008).  Although the auditor’s 
report is meant to be a communication tool, the emphasis on standard language caused the 
auditor’s report to transform into a symbol of the auditor’s work or reputation, as opposed 
to an informative document for users of financial statements (Church, et al., 2008).  As a 
result, there have been requests in recent years for the PCAOB to reexamine the purpose of 
the auditor’s report and how it can be used to communicate more effectively to investors.   
The auditor’s report in the United Kingdom followed a similar trajectory to that of 
the US, until recently.  The rule-making body in the UK is the Financial Reporting Council, 
or FRC.  Whereas the PCAOB issues Auditing Standards, commonly referred to as AS’s, the 
FRC issues International Standards on Auditing, or ISAs.  The ISA that is of particular 
interest is ISA (UK) 700 because this is the standard that expanded the auditor’s report in 
the UK as of 2013.  Another standard-setting board, the International Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board, or IAASB, also issues ISAs, which explains why “UK” is in 
parentheses for those ISAs issued by the FRC.  However, I will refer to the UK standard, 
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ISA (UK) 700, as ISA 700 for simplicity.  Throughout my analysis, I refer to the years prior 
to and including 2013, before the expanded auditor’s report was included in annual reports, 
as the pre-ISA 700 period.  The post-ISA 700 period refers to the years after 2013, when the 
expanded auditor’s report came into practice.   
ISA 700 dramatically changes the auditor’s report in a few key ways.  First, it allows 
the auditor to take a more free-form approach to writing the report, as opposed to following 
a standard outline.  Second, it requires auditors to explicitly identify CAMs and risks of 
material misstatement.  Third, it requires auditors to describe how the scope of the audit and 
the determined level of materiality addressed CAMs and risks of material misstatement 
(Financial Reporting Council, June, 2016).  In a summary analysis regarding the evolution of 
the auditor’s report published by PricewaterhouseCoopers, an accounting firm that provides 
auditing services throughout the world including the UK, the authors succinctly describe 
some of their perceived benefits of the expanded auditor’s report: 
“Our opinion is now less than a tenth of the overall report.  We now describe the 
risks of material misstatement that had the greatest effect on our audit and how we 
addressed those risks.  We highlight where we performed our work, and why, both 
from a geographic and company structure perspective.  We describe the materiality 
we used to help us determine the scope of our audit and to evaluate misstatements.” 
 
An important element of the expanded report is that because auditors can write freely about 
specific events and circumstances in both the macro and micro environment affecting the 
company in the year under audit, stakeholders can more easily determine the identity of the 
company – even if the name of the company were to be covered up (Chalmers, et al., 2015).  
The authors shared with readers that “some shareholders have told [them] that the audit 
report is the first thing they turn to in the Annual Report (Chalmers, et al., 2015).”  This 
speaks to the value of the audit report to shareholders, investors, and other users, and to the 
credibility of the auditor’s opinion.  
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In January 2016 the FRC released a report reviewing the successes and shortcomings 
of the expanded auditor’s report thus far.  In the summary for investors, the FRC reports 
auditors have succeeded in moving away from “generic language and descriptions of risk, 
making their reports more relevant and insightful (Financial Reporting Council, January, 
2017).”  Investors especially appreciate the ease of following the new structure, due to the 
deliberate use of signposting, graphics, diagrams and color.  However, investors still have 
requests for what they see lacking in the reports, including more information about 
sensitivity ranges used in audit testing; greater insight into the auditor’s assessment of 
internal controls; and explicitness about the auditor’s view on the appropriateness of 
management estimates (Financial Reporting Council, January, 2017).  Overall, it appears that 
there was some value added – at least in the appearance and the ease of reading the auditor’s 
report – yet investors are still lacking some of the information that they were hoping to 
receive.  
 
B. PCAOB Proposal 
In response to concerns of investors and other financial statement users that the 
auditor’s report could be more informative and a better communicative tool, the PCAOB 
began outreach in 2010 on possible changes to the auditor's report (PCAOB Release 2011-
003, June 21, 2011).  This effort led to a Concept Release in 2011, followed by the issuance 
of a Proposed Rule in 2013 and a Reproposed Rule in 2016.  As of March 2017, the PCAOB 
is drafting a release for Board action.  This section and Exhibit 1 outline the timeline and 
main points of the PCAOB’s standard-setting project on the auditor’s reporting model.  
 On June 21, 2011 the PCAOB issued a Concept Release to address alternatives for 
changing the auditor’s reporting model.  The Concept Release came in response to concerns 
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of investors and other financial statement users that the auditor’s report could be more 
informative and generally a better communicative tool than it is currently (PCAOB Release 
2011-003, June 21, 2011).  The Concept Release presented a number of alternatives for 
investors, financial statement preparers, auditors, audit committee members, and others to 
respond to with comments and questions, in order for the PCAOB to develop a formal 
proposal (PCAOB Release 2011-003, June 21, 2011).  Among the alternatives discussed in 
the Concept Release were the addition of an Auditor’s Discussion and Analysis; required use 
of emphasis paragraphs; auditor reporting on information outside the financial statements; 
and clarification of certain language in the auditor’s report (PCAOB Release 2011-003, June 
21, 2011).  The Concept Release was used to solicit public comment about the alternatives, 
as well as to invite interested parties to join a public roundtable, held on September 15, 2011, 
to discuss the alternatives (PCAOB Release 2011-003, June 21, 2011). 
Following the Concept Release, roundtable, and solicitation of comments, the 
PCAOB released the first version of the Proposed Rule on August 13, 2013.  This proposal 
explains that investors believe that auditors gain knowledge during the audit that is not 
known to investors that might assist them in making investment decisions (PCAOB Release 
2013-005, August 13, 2013).  The PCAOB goes on to explain that the auditor’s report has 
remained largely unchanged in the U.S. since the 1940s, yet the report is undergoing change 
globally (PCAOB Release 2013-005, August 13, 2013).  This first version of the proposal 
included three significant changes to the existing auditor’s report, including reporting critical 
audit matters; adding elements related to auditor independence, tenure, and responsibilities 
for other information; and enhancing certain standardized language (PCAOB Release 2013-
005, August 13, 2013).  These proposed standards are meant to increase the informational 
value of the auditor’s report without placing an undue burden on the financial reporting 
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process (PCAOB Release 2013-005, August 13, 2013).  Following the release of this initial 
proposal, the PCAOB hosted Standing Advisory Group meetings, Investor Advisory Group 
meetings, and a public meeting on the auditor’s reporting model between November of 2013 
and October of 2014 to invite further comments and prepare revisions for the proposed rule 
(PCAOB Release 2013-005, August 13, 2013).  
In response to the meetings and additional commentary from investors, financial 
statement preparers, auditors, audit committee members, and other users of financial 
statements, the PCAOB released a Reproposed Rule on May 11, 2016.  Although this latest 
proposal retains the pass/fail nature of the auditor’s report, it introduces significant changes 
as well (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016).  These changes include (1) determining, 
communicating, and documenting critical audit matters; (2) clarifying the auditor’s role and 
responsibilities, specifically with regards to independence, tenure, and addressee; (3) adding 
explanatory language and emphasis paragraphs; (4) including information about certain audit 
participants; and (5) clarifying the form of the auditor’s report (PCAOB Release 2016-003, 
May 11, 2016).   
The first element of the reproposal related to critical audit matters (CAMs) required 
the most attention, particularly with regards to defining a CAM because the definition 
changed moderately from the 2013 proposal (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016).  
CAMs are defined as those matters that were communicated or were required to be 
communicated to the audit committee; that relate to accounts or disclosures that are material 
to the financial statements; and that involved especially challenging, subjective, or complex 
auditor judgment (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016). 
The second element which clarifies the auditor’s role and responsibilities includes the 
addition of an independence statement to enhance financial statement users’ understanding 
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of the auditor’s existing obligation to be independent, and serves as a reminder to the auditor 
of this obligation (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016).  Further, the PCAOB proposes 
to make it uniform that the auditor addresses shareholders and the board of directors, with 
the option to include other addressees (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016).  In 
addition, the PCAOB proposes that auditor tenure be disclosed.  However, the Board is also 
seeking comment on whether auditor tenure would be more appropriate on the recently 
adopted Form AP, Auditor Reporting of Certain Audit Participants (PCAOB Release 2016-003, 
May 11, 2016). 
The third element of the reproposed standard provides examples of potential matters 
that the auditor may choose to emphasize in the auditor's report.  These additional emphasis 
paragraphs may be used when there is substantial doubt about the company’s ability to 
continue as a going concern or in the event of a restatement of previously issued financial 
statements (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016).  The auditor may also decide to 
emphasize other matters in the financial statements or use additional explanatory language if 
the auditor determines it is appropriate to do so. 
The fourth element of inclusion of information about certain audit participants is 
optional under the reproposed standard (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016).  The 
purpose of this element is to incorporate a new Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
amendment that requires firms to disclose engagement partners and other accounting firms 
on Form AP, with the choice of also disclosing this information in the auditor’s report 
(PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016).  The reproposed standard does not include a 
specific location for this disclosure (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016). 
Finally, the fifth element related to the form of the auditor’s report offers auditors 
more flexibility in presentation (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016).  The reproposed 
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rule would require the “Opinion on the Financial Statements” section to be the first section 
of the auditor's report, immediately followed by the “Basis for Opinion” section, but the 
other sections – including CAMs and explanatory paragraphs – would have no specific order 
(PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016). 
 
C. Academic Research 
 Various researchers have come to a number of conclusions about whether or not 
the expanded auditor’s report is more informative than reports of the past.  Marcus M. 
Doxey found that auditor disclosures regarding management estimates increase the 
transparency and value-relevance of the audit report (Doxey, 2014).  Doxey used MBA 
students from a major land-grant university in the US as participants in the experiment.  In 
Doxey’s experiment he gave participants auditor’s reports for different companies, all of 
which received unqualified opinions (passing assessments), and asked them to decide how 
much they would invest in each company.  He found that participants’ evaluation of 
management was generally intuitive, whereas evaluation of auditor independence was 
unintuitive.  Participants reduced their investments in companies in which they perceived 
aggressive reporting choices by management, such as those related to estimates.  This is 
intuitive because participants may suspect that aggressive reporting choices indicate 
management bias or attempted earnings management, so they are unlikely to find those 
choices reliable.  
However, subjects rated auditors who agreed with management as more independent 
than those who publicly disagree (Doxey, 2014).  Standard-setters may anticipate the 
opposite to happen – that auditors who disagree with management would be seen as more 
independent – but given an unqualified opinion, disagreement seems to violate users’ 
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expectations of the auditor’s view of the fairness of the financial statements.  Some auditors 
have voiced concern that users may misinterpret additions to an expanded auditor’s report, 
and Doxey’s finding may support that concern.  However, Doxey also found that expanding 
audit disclosures to include the auditor’s views on estimates actually reduces user’s views of 
the level of assurance provided by an audit.  Often users believe an audit provides absolute 
assurance when in fact auditors are required only to provide reasonable assurance (Louwers, 
et al., 2015).  This finding suggests that an expanded report adds value in that it reduces the 
expectations gap and clarifies the position of the auditor.  
Lennox, Schmidt, and Thompson also tackle the question of whether the expanded 
UK audit report is more informative to users.  Consistent with my hypothesis of US 
reporting, they find that in prior annual reports management has already disclosed many 
risks of material misstatement (RMMs) that the auditor is now required to report as CAMs 
(Lennox, et al., 2016).  The researchers found that only 20% of the auditor risk disclosures 
were potentially new in the first year of the expanded report.  They add that many times 
management is disclosing these risks outside of the annual reports, such as through 
conference calls.  Additionally, they find that users do not find these disclosures to be 
incrementally informative.  Market reactions were insignificant for small companies, 
companies with low analyst followings, and companies with low ownership by large 
shareholders (Lennox, et al., 2016).  
Another concern with the additional risk disclosures is that the RMMs reported by 
the auditor may have been relevant to the interim financial statements, yet are irrelevant to 
the audited financial statements.  This could explain why market reactions are insignificant or 
why investors do not find the disclosures to be incrementally informative, either because the 
RMMs were eliminated during the audit by performing extended audit procedures or 
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because investors already knew about the risks before the expanded auditor reports were 
introduced (Lennox, et al., 2016).  However, it can be argued that disclosure by an auditor is 
more credible than disclosure by management, thus adding value to the risk disclosures 
(Lennox, et al., 2016).   
Smith also found little evidence that markets had an observable response to the 
introduction of the expanded audit reports, although she found that the readability and the 
tone of the reports changed.  Other researchers rated audit reports in the pre-ISA 700 period 
to be “very difficult” and even “inhibitive” in effectively communicating audit results to 
financial statement users (Smith, 2016).  On the FOG scale1 that Smith uses, audit reports 
required more years of formal education for user comprehension than Form 10-Ks and Wall 
Street Journal articles.  However, in the post-ISA 700 period users require five fewer years of 
formal education to comprehend the reports as compared to comprehending the pre-ISA 
700 reports (Smith, 2016).  These findings suggest that expanded audit reports are more 
accessible to users because the language has changed in a way that makes them easier to 
read, suggesting that boilerplate language is indeed changing.  
As for tone, Smith found the post-ISA 700 reports to include more negative words, 
which could be explained by auditors disclosing more RMMs and detailing the impact of 
those risks on the scope of the audit.  Additionally, she found that there was a higher rate of 
all tone related words (positive, negative, and uncertain), suggesting that additional 
disclosures were not standard in nature but in fact potentially added value to the reports 
(Smith, 2016).   
																																																								
1 The Fog Index (FOG) is a widely used readability statistic developed by Robert Gunning (Gunning ,1952) that 
evaluates the number of words in a sentence and the percentage of complex words (words with three syllables 
or more) to estimate the number of formal years of education an average person would need to read and 
comprehend the text.  The higher the measure the more complex the text. 
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Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski examine the potential of the proposal to increase 
auditor liability and subsequent litigation (Gimbar, et al., December 2015).  They review five 
experiments that address this question and identify patterns in the research.  They 
differentiate between related CAMs (those that specifically relate to litigated issues) and 
unrelated CAMs (those that discuss high-risk accounting issues that are different from the 
accounting issues identified in litigation).  Although they identify a variety of conclusions 
among the five experiments, preliminary evidence indicates that legal liability is either 
reduced or unchanged when a related CAM is included in the audit report, subject to two 
notable exceptions.  First, a related CAM for which audit procedures are also described in 
the report tends to increase perception of auditor liability, as well as foreseeability of the 
misstatement (Backof, 2014).  Second, a CAM is associated with higher perception of auditor 
liability when the related accounting standard is precise (rules-based) as opposed to less 
precise (principles-based) (Gimbar, et al., August 2015).  
Gimbar, et al. note that the results about unrelated CAMs are mixed and less 
conclusive than the results for related CAMs (Gimbar, et al., December 2015).  Because 
unrelated CAMs do not serve as disclaimers in the way that related CAMs do, some 
experiments concluded that they increased perception of auditor liability (Gimbar, et al., 
December 2015).  However, other researchers found that inclusion of a CAM had no effect 
on this perception, and one experiment found that an unrelated CAM actually reduced the 
perception of auditor liability when compared to situations where the auditor explicitly 
disclosed that no CAMs were identified in the audit (Brasel, et al.).  Gimbar, et al. noted 
some limitations with their examination of the five experiments, including the fact that the 
experiments engage four different participant pools, which could explain much of the 
variation in results (Gimbar, et al., December 2015).  In addition, they raise the questions of 
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how precision of the audit standards influences auditor liability perception, and whether 
clarifying language about the audit procedures could interact with CAM disclosures (Gimbar, 
et al., December 2015).  
In a second paper, Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski perform their own experiment 
related to the similarities between imprecise standards and CAMs (Gimbar, et al., August 
2015).  Using students enrolled in introductory accounting courses to model jurors, they 
introduce a scenario in which “a large pension fund investor alleges that the auditor allowed 
the company’s equipment leases to be inappropriately classified as operating instead of 
capital.”  They note that “lease classification is an ideal setting in which to examine precise 
and imprecise standards, as bright-line thresholds exist in the precise environment, while 
judgment is more clearly required when imprecise standards are applied.”   
They find that imprecise standards require greater auditor judgment and skill and 
therefore increase auditor liability, whereas precise standards constrain auditor control over 
financial reporting outcomes and therefore decrease auditor liability (Gimbar, et al., August 
2015).  However, when a related CAM is disclosed under precise standards jurors perceive 
auditors to have a causal role in and an ability to foresee an audit failure because like 
imprecise standards, related CAMs require greater auditor judgment and skill (Gimbar, et al., 
August 2015).  In addition they find that when an unrelated CAM is disclosed under precise 
standards jurors question the quality of the audit and the auditor’s intent to take the 
necessary actions to prevent accounting misstatement (Gimbar, et al., August 2015).  Thus, 
both related and unrelated CAMs are increasing auditor liability in the same way that 
imprecise standards do, even when they are applied under precise standards (Gimbar, et al., 
August 2015).  They argue that the results of this experiment could lead auditors to increase 
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the amount of audit work given the higher litigation risk, and could subsequently increase 
audit fees (Gimbar, et al., August 2015).  
Gutierrez, Minutti-Meza, Tatum, and Vulcheva examine changes in audit fees, audit 
quality, and investors’ reaction to the expanded auditor’s report (Gutierrez, et al., 2016).  As 
for audit fee changes, they find mixed results ranging from an increase of nearly four percent 
to no change in the post-ISA 700 period, depending on the specificity of the model 
(Gutierrez, et al., 2016).  As for audit quality, they do not find evidence of change.  The most 
striking change they identify is the length of the audit report, which triples on average from 
757 words to 2,400 words (Gutierrez, et al., 2016).  They also note a decrease in the 
incidence of including internal control issues as a risk (Gutierrez, et al., 2016).  Finally for 
investor reaction they find little change, possibly because the additional information may not 
be strictly new to investors, as they may already be using other information sources (such as 
management discussions, financial analyst reports, and audit committee reports) to gather 
the same information, or they may infer certain risks based upon observable characteristics 
of the company, such as size or presence of intangible assets including goodwill (Gutierrez, 
et al., 2016).  They also find in their descriptive statistics that the public release of the annual 
report is generally not a significant source of new information for investors, either before or 
after the introduction of the expanded auditor’s report (Gutierrez, et al., 2016).  
In conclusion, the existing research has yielded mixed results on the benefits of the 
expanded auditor’s report.  I chose to evaluate how informative the expanded report is by 
comparing those matters that the auditor is now reporting to matters that management 
already reports.  In the next section, I define my research question and explain my 
procedure. 
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V. Research Question: Does the Expanded Report Provide New Information? 
 
 Using annual reports from four companies in the UK, I examine whether the 
expanded auditor report is reporting the same risks and critical audit matters that 
management has already been reporting.  Thus, investors will be receiving the same 
information in two different places.  One implication of reporting the same information is 
that the expanded auditor report is not as valuable because it is not adding new information.  
One limitation is in determining whether new information added by the auditor encourages 
management to also mention the issue, which also makes it difficult to measure the value of 
the expanded report.  
 To examine this hypothesis, I acquired annual reports from four major grocery 
chains (Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Marks and Spencer, and Morrison’s) in the UK for the years 2010 
to 2016.  I specifically chose these firms because they are the only grocery chains in the UK 
that are publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange and primarily based in the UK.  One 
other chain, Ocado, is also traded on the London Stock Exchange, but it is an online-only 
supermarket, which would make it difficult to compare to the others.  I chose companies 
that are in the same industry because they are likely to be reporting the same or similar risks 
and critical matters from year to year.  Thus, investors are likely to know these risks already.  
I chose the time range to have a sample of reports before ISA 700 (from 2010 through 2013) 
and after ISA 700 (from 2014 through 2016).   
I went through all of the reports manually and coded the risks into three categories: 
(1) those reported only by management, (2) those reported only by the external auditor, and 
(3) those reported by both management and the external auditor.  For those years prior to 
ISA 700 when the risks were not as easily located in the report, I typically found them 
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disclosed in the audit committee report or the note to the financial statements that describes 
“areas of significant judgment.”  My conclusion is that items that fall into category three are 
essentially redundant – the investor is gaining the information in two different places, and he 
or she was likely already aware of the risk from last year’s report if management was 
reporting it then.  
The evidence is clear that in the post-ISA 700 period, many items that were 
previously reported only by management are now being reported by both management and 
the external auditor.  In the section that follows I will highlight some of these items and the 
trends I found in the data.  
 
VI. Results 
 
 The CAMs that I highlight below are those that three or four of the companies 
consistently reported from year to year.  Table 1 lists the external auditor for each company 
for each year in the analysis.  One limitation of my analysis is that PwC is the external 
auditor for each of the companies at one time or another.  Examples of auditor’s reports in 
both the pre-ISA 700 period and the post-ISA 700 period can be found in Appendix A and 
Appendix B, respectively. 
 
Capitalization and impairment of tangible and intangible assets 
As shown in Table 2, all four firms reported capitalization and impairment of 
tangible and intangible assets as a critical matter.2  Management at three of the firms – Marks 
and Spencer (M&S), Sainsbury’s, and Tesco – reported it from 2010-2016.  From 2014-2016 																																																								
2 In some reports it was referred to simply as depreciation or amortization. 
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(the post-ISA 700 period) all four firms fell into category three – that both management and 
the external auditor were reporting the matter.  For three firms, this is a great example of 
redundancy in the expanded auditor’s report.  Not only were three out of the four firms 
reporting this risk in the pre-ISA 700 period, but also by the time the expanded auditor’s 
report was in place management and the external auditor were including it.   
Interestingly, Morrison’s was using a different external auditor (KPMG) than the 
other three companies (all of whom used PwC) in 2014, the year in which management and 
the external auditor across all four firms began including the risk.  In the case of the three 
companies whose management was reporting it in the pre-ISA 700 period, one could infer 
that PwC possibly picked up this CAM from management.  Yet for Morrison’s, it is unclear 
whether the inclusion of the CAM was a result of management influencing the auditors or 
the auditors influencing management (or neither).  
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Post-retirement benefits and pension valuation 
 As shown in Table 3, the four companies follow a similar pattern with reporting 
post-retirement benefits and pension valuation as a critical matter, again with the exception 
of Morrison’s.  The managements of all four companies reported post-retirement benefits 
and pension valuation as a risk from 2010-2013 (the pre-ISA 700 period).  In 2014, 
Morrison’s management discontinues reporting the matter. However, the managements of 
the remaining three firms continue to report the matter from 2014-2016 (the post-ISA 700 
period).  The external auditors for M&S and Sainsbury’s also reported the matter as a CAM 
in 2015 and 2016, and the external auditor for Tesco followed suit in 2016.  Again, these are 
examples of redundancy between what management and the external auditor are reporting.  
		 23 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
Internal control and risk management 
 As shown in Table 4, internal control and risk management is an example of a critical 
matter that only began appearing in the auditor’s report in the post-ISA 700 period.  
However, it follows a non-uniform pattern.   
 In 2014, all four companies are reporting the matter somewhere.  Only Morrison’s 
management reports it, whereas only the external auditors for the other three companies 
report it.  In 2015, the external auditors for Sainsbury’s and Tesco report the matter.  
Morrison’s and M&S do not report it at all.  In 2015 M&S changed external auditors to 
Deloitte, which could explain why this matter disappears.  In 2016, management at 
Morrison’s reports the matter again and the external auditor for Tesco reports it.  Sainsbury’s 
and M&S do not report it at all.  Interestingly, Tesco switched external auditors to Deloitte 
in 2016 and it continued being listed as a CAM, yet it was not for M&S in 2015.  In 2016 
Sainsbury’s changed external auditors from PwC to EY, which could explain why this matter 
disappears.  
 This appears to be a critical matter that both management and external auditors are 
unsure of year to year.  It is inconsistent, yet apparently still relevant, so it will be interesting 
to see how this issue plays out in years to come.  It also raises the question of whether the 
choice of external auditor influences what key audit matters get reported, not only by the 
external auditor but also by management. 
 Also, this non-uniform pattern made me notice another unusual pattern related to 
Morrison’s.  Morrison’s never has any risks that fall into category 2 – those items reported 
only by the external auditor.  For Morrison’s, either management reports on something or 
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both management and the external auditor report on it.  For three out of the four risks that 
Morrison’s external auditor includes in 2014, that is also the first year that management 
includes them.  This suggests once more that items reported by the external auditor 
influence items reported by management.  
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Revenue recognition – refunds, loyalty schemes, and returns 
 As shown in table 5, the trend for reporting revenue recognition, including refunds, 
loyalty schemes, and returns, as a critical matter is not as obvious as those previously 
mentioned.  The patterns indicate that not all external auditors view this as a key audit matter 
each year, and management seems split on the issue as well.  However, for firms who report 
this risk (all except Morrison’s) either the external auditor is solely reporting this item or 
both management and the external auditor are reporting it by 2016.  
 Marks and Spencer has the simplest pattern, in that management reports the matter 
from 2010-2013, and both management and the external auditor report it from 2014-2016.  
 Sainsbury’s is more complicated.  Management only reports the matter in 2013.  The 
external auditor, PwC, reports it in 2014, does not report it in 2015, and then their new 
external auditor, EY, reports it in 2016.  
 Tesco’s management did not report the matter prior to 2015.  In 2014 the external 
auditor included it as a CAM, and in 2015 and 2016 both management and the external 
auditor highlighted it.   
Again, these observations support the idea that items reported by the external 
auditor often become items reported by management in subsequent years, and the choice of 
auditor can have an impact on what matters are included as CAMs. 
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[Insert Table 5]  
 
Useful life, residual value, carrying value of PPE 
 Reporting useful life, residual value, or carrying value of property, plant, and 
equipment (PPE) as a critical matter stood out to me because it appeared in annual reports 
of three of the four companies (all but Tesco), yet it was never included as a CAM by the 
external auditor.  As shown in Table 6, Marks and Spencer reported it from 2010-2016; 
Morrison’s reported it from 2010-2013; and Sainsbury’s only reported it in 2016.  This 
suggests that there are instances where management reports something that they feel is of 
high importance, regardless of whether the external auditor chooses to report it as well. 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
IT infrastructure and data security 
 The matter of IT infrastructure and data security is interesting because the reporting 
patterns vary a substantial amount from firm to firm.  As shown in Table 7, all firms except 
Marks and Spencer included it.  
 Sainsbury’s management reported it from 2012-2015, and the external auditor 
reported it in 2015 and 2016.  It’s interesting that they overlap only in 2015 and that even 
though management reported it for so many consecutive years, only the external auditor 
reports it in 2016.  This could lend credence to the idea that CAMs reported by the external 
auditor are more credible than those reported by management, which could cause 
management to cease including it.  
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 Another interesting pattern is that Tesco’s external auditor includes it in 2016, which 
is the first time users see it in Tesco’s report.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, 
Morrison’s management reports it from 2014-2016, yet the external auditor never includes it.   
 These three patterns are difficult to reconcile and compare to draw conclusions.  
[Insert Table 7] 
 
Other trends 
 Some of the risks included in the reports appeared in fewer than three of the firms, 
but trends are apparent and worth mentioning.  
 First, Morrison’s and Tesco have the same pattern for onerous lease provisions and 
onerous property commitments, wherein management reports it from 2010-2013 (pre-ISA 
700) and both management and the external auditor report it 2014-2016 (post-ISA 700). 
 Second, management and the external auditor specifically include inventory valuation 
for both Marks and Spencer (2014-2016) and Tesco (2015-2016).  
 Finally, Marks and Spencer and Sainsbury’s have similar patterns for supply chain 
and supplier income accounting.  Sainsbury’s external auditor includes the risk in 2014, and 
then both management and the external auditor include it in 2015 and 2016.  Marks and 
Spencer exhibits the same reporting pattern in 2015 and 2016.  
 
 
VII. Discussion and Conclusion 
 As I have indicated in a number of examples, management and the external auditors 
are frequently identifying the same risks, particularly by 2016 after ISA 700 has been in place 
for three years.  This suggests that there is little added value in the expanded auditor’s report 
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if users are acquiring the same information in two different locations.  However, it also may 
suggest that what the auditor reports influences what management reports, and this is where 
the value may be added in that management is essentially being encouraged to report the 
most important matters to investors and other financial statement users.  Further, there is 
something to be said for auditor credibility and the fact that perception of auditor 
independence is enhanced when auditors agree with management when giving an unqualified 
opinion (Doxey 2014).  
 This finding is important for the PCAOB to be aware of as they consider whether or 
not to adopt the standard for an expanded auditor’s report.  They must consider the costs of 
implementing the change if the benefits are small.  So far there is not evidence in the UK 
that expanding the auditor’s report causes audit fees to increase.  In fact, auditors are already 
in the practice of charging higher audit fees to those clients they identify as having more 
risks of material misstatement (Lennox, et al., 2016).  
 Further research about the effect of switching auditors on the CAMs reported by 
management would be useful for the PCAOB in deciding whether to expand the auditor’s 
report.  From the limited data that I’ve compiled, it is difficult to discern major trends in this 
area or to draw conclusions about the level of impact an external auditor has on 
management’s reporting choices.  
 It is unclear if and when the PCAOB will vote on the new standard.  On December 
23, 2016 one board member, Jay D. Hanson, resigned from the board, making a consensus 
on the vote perhaps more difficult to achieve (Hood 2016).  Also, James Doty has already 
exceeded his term limit as chairman of the board, and the new Trump administration could 
appoint someone else before the PCAOB has a chance to vote (Rapoport 2016).   
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 A major improvement in the expanded report is definitely in the ease of reading 
exactly which matters the auditor identifies as critical to the audit.  Like the investors 
surveyed by the FRC, I too can attest to the fact that the signposting and diagrams are useful 
in understanding the content of the auditor’s report, which supports Smith’s finding that 
readability has increased.  However, my analysis still shows that management consistently 
reports many of those same matters, so the question of added value remains.  
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Exhibit 1: PCAOB Proposal Timeline 
 
Date Description Main Points 
June 21, 2011 Concept Release Discussion of alternatives3 for changing the auditor’s reporting 
model: 
1. A supplement to the auditor’s report in which the 
auditor would be required to provide additional 
information about the audit and the company’s 
financial statements (“Auditor’s Discussion and 
Analysis”) 
2. Required and expanded use of emphasis paragraphs in 
the auditor’s report 
3. Auditor reporting on information outside the financial 
statements (e.g., non-GAAP information and earnings 
releases) 
4. Clarification of certain language in the auditor’s report 
(e.g., reasonable assurance and auditor independence) 
August 13, 2013 Proposed Rule Three significant changes to the existing auditor’s report: 
1. Auditor reporting of critical audit matters.4 
2. Add new elements related to auditor independence, 
auditor tenure, and the auditor’s responsibility for 
other information in annual reports containing the 
audited financial statements and the related auditor’s 
report 
3. Enhance certain standardized language in the auditor's 
report, including the addition of the phrase "whether 
due to error or fraud"5 and the ability to include 
explanatory paragraphs 
May 11, 2016 Reproposed Rule Retains pass/fail model, but adds significant changes 
1. Determination, communication, and documentation of 
critical audit matters6 
2. Clarification of existing auditor’s responsibilities (e.g., 
independence, tenure, addressee) 
3. Adding explanatory language and emphasis paragraphs 
4. Including information about certain audit participants 
(e.g., engagement partners and other accounting firms 
that participate in the audit) 
5. Clarifying the form of the auditor’s report 
 
 
 
 
  																																																								
3 A revised auditor’s report could include one or a combination of these alternatives, elements within the 
alternatives or alternatives not currently presented in this concept release. 
4 Defined as those matters addressed during the audit that (1) involved the most difficult, subjective, or 
complex auditor judgments; (2) posed the most difficulty to the auditor in obtaining sufficient appropriate 
evidence; or (3) posed the most difficulty to the auditor in forming the opinion on the financial statements. 
5 This phrase is used when describing the auditor's responsibility under PCAOB standards to obtain reasonable 
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatements, whether due to error or 
fraud. 
6 Defined as	those matters that (1) were communicated or required to be communicated to the audit 
committee; (2) relate to accounts or disclosures that are material to the financial statements; and (3) involved 
especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment.	
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Table 1: External Auditor by Year 
     
        
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Marks and Spencer PwC PwC PwC PwC PwC Deloitte Deloitte 
Morrison's KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG PwC PwC 
Sainsbury's PwC PwC PwC PwC PwC PwC E&Y 
Tesco PwC PwC PwC PwC PwC PwC Deloitte 
 
 
Key 
 
  PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers 
KPMG Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler 
Deloitte Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited 
EY formerly Ernst and Young 
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Table 2: Capitalization and impairment of tangible and intangible assets 
 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Marks and Spencer               
Morrison's               
Sainsbury's               
Tesco               
 
 
Key 
 
  Reported by management 
  Reported by external auditor 
  Reported by both 
 
 
This table indicates whether management, the external auditor, or both were reporting 
capitalization and impairment of tangible and intangible assets as a key audit matter.  Blank 
(white) boxes indicate that neither management nor the external auditor identified it as a key 
audit matter.  Years 2010-2013 include reports prior to the expansion; years 2014-2016 
include expanded auditor’s reports. 
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Table 3: Post-retirement benefits and pension valuation  
 
		 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Marks and Spencer               
Morrison's         		 		 		
Sainsbury's               
Tesco               
  
 
Key 
 
  Reported by management 
  Reported by external auditor 
  Reported by both 
 
 
This table indicates whether management, the external auditor, or both were reporting post-
retirement benefits and pension valuation as a key audit matter.  Blank (white) boxes indicate 
that neither management nor the external auditor identified it as a key audit matter.  Years 
2010-2013 include reports prior to the expansion; years 2014-2016 include expanded 
auditor’s reports. 
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Table 4: Internal control and risk management  
 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Marks and Spencer               
Morrison's               
Sainsbury's               
Tesco               
  
 
Key 
 
  Reported by management 
  Reported by external auditor 
  Reported by both 
 
 
This table indicates whether management, the external auditor, or both were reporting 
internal control and risk management as a key audit matter.  Blank (white) boxes indicate 
that neither management nor the external auditor identified it as a key audit matter.  Years 
2010-2013 include reports prior to the expansion; years 2014-2016 include expanded 
auditor’s reports.  
 
  
		 34 
Table 5: Revenue recognition – refunds, loyalty schemes, and returns  
 
		 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Marks and Spencer               
Morrison's 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Sainsbury's 		 		 		         
Tesco 		 		 		 		       
  
 
Key 
 
  Reported by management 
  Reported by external auditor 
  Reported by both 
 
 
This table indicates whether management, the external auditor, or both were reporting 
revenue recognition, including refunds, loyalty schemes, and returns, as a key audit matter.  
Blank (white) boxes indicate that neither management nor the external auditor identified it as 
a key audit matter.  Years 2010-2013 include reports prior to the expansion; years 2014-2016 
include expanded auditor’s reports.  
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Table 6: Useful life, residual value, carrying value of PPE  
 
		 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Marks and Spencer               
Morrison's         		 		 		
Sainsbury's 		 		 		 		 		 		   
Tesco 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
  
 
Key 
 
  Reported by management 
  Reported by external auditor 
  Reported by both 
 
 
This table indicates whether management, the external auditor, or both were reporting useful 
life, residual value, and/or carrying value of property, plant and equipment (PPE) as a key 
audit matter.  Blank (white) boxes indicate that neither management nor the external auditor 
identified it as a key audit matter.  Years 2010-2013 include reports prior to the expansion; 
years 2014-2016 include expanded auditor’s reports. 
 
 
  
		 36 
Table 7: IT infrastructure and data security  
 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Marks and Spencer               
Morrison's               
Sainsbury's               
Tesco               
  
 
Key 
 
  Reported by management 
  Reported by external auditor 
  Reported by both 
 
 
This table indicates whether management, the external auditor, or both were reporting IT 
infrastructure and data security as a key audit matter.  Blank (white) boxes indicate that 
neither management nor the external auditor identified it as a key audit matter.  Years 2010-
2013 include reports prior to the expansion; years 2014-2016 include expanded auditor’s 
reports.  
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Appendix A: 2009 Auditors’ Report – Tesco (Pre-ISA 700) 
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Appendix B: 2016 Auditors’ Report – Tesco (Post-ISA 700)
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